WYOM m V. HOUGHTON: WrrH SCALIA IN THE DRIvER'S
SEAT, IS THE SUPREME COURT ON THE ROAD TO A
"PUBLIC PLACE" EXCEPTION?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution' has
both the prudence of brevity and the vice of uncertainty in
pronouncing the fundamental rights of citizens to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. To honor the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment, courts must resolve the ambiguities that stem
from the divided nature of the provision. The amendment consists
of two distinct clauses.4
The Reasonableness Clause prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Warrant Clause
establishes requirements for the issuance of search warrants."
Understanding the relationship between the clauses is essential in
determining the overall application of the amendment. 6 The United
I See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
SeeJACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42 (1966)

(noting that the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the public's liberty interests from unreasonable
governmental intrusion).

5

SeeJOsHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.01, at 161
(2d

ed. 1997).
4 See Keith Shotzberger, Oveniew of the Fourth Amendment, 85 GEo. L.J.
821, 821
(1997) (noting that "[t] he Amendment contains two separate clauses: a prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a requirement that probable cause
support each warrant").
See id; see also ARNOLD H. LOEWY & ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
ARREST AND INVESTIGATION 1 (1996) ("The Fourth Amendment offers two major
protections - one substantive, and the other procedural. The primary substantive
protection is probable cause. The primary procedural protection is the requirement
that a warrant be issued by an independent magistrate prior to the search or
seizure.")

See LANDYNSKI, supra note 2, at 42. Two schools of thought have emerged
concerning the relationship between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant
Clause. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 159-60; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
6
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States Supreme Court has labored over the role that the framers
intended
the 7 search warrant to play in Fourth Amendment
•
•
jurisprudence. Particularly in the context of automobile searches,
the recent trend has been to abandon a rigid warrant requirement in
favor of a more fluid reasonableness standard.8
The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed the principle that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and subject only to
established exceptions. One such exception, commonly known as
the automobile exception, ' arises when the police have probable
Amendment First Principles, 107 HAmv. L. REv. 757, 762 (1994) (explaining the two
variants of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement). One view holds that the
clauses are vitally linked because Fourth Amendment reasonableness turns upon the
presence of a warrant for every search and seizure when obtaining a warrant is
practical. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 160; see also Nadine Strossen, The
FourthAmendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1988) (stating that the Court's
application of a mere reasonableness test or balancing test has eroded Fourth
Amendment rights).
The competing view holds that the clauses are distinct and independent, and
that the Warrant Clause states when warrants may issue, and not when they must. See
DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 160 (emphasis added); see also Lewis R. Katz, The
Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant
Requirement, 36 CASEW. REs. L. REv. 375, 378 (1986) (stating that the language of the
Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require a warrant for every search and
seizure). Justice Scalia has taken a similar position, declaring that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it
merely prohibits searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable.'" California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Acevedo, see infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia observed that
Fourth Amendment law has "lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical
warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone." Id.
8 SeeDRESSLER, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 165.
9 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). The Katz Court recognized that warrantless criminal
searches are per se unreasonable unless the search falls under one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
10 See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (establishing the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement). For a
discussion of Carrol see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. Commentators
have taken a variety of positions regarding the warrant requirement as it applies to
automobile searches. See, e.g., Robert Angell, Note, California v. Acevedo and the
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 707, 733-34 (1992) (stating that the
Supreme Court's expansion of the automobile exception has resulted in the erosion
of Fourth Amendment protections); NormaJ. Briscoe, Comment, The Right to Be Free
from Unreasonable Searches and the Warrantless Searches of Closed Containersin Automobiles,
36 How. L.J. 215, 216 (1993) (arguing that the application of the automobile
exception to containers found during the course of an automobile exception search
is, as a matter of law, unreasonable); Mary Brandt Jensen, Note, The Scope of
WarrantlessSearches Under the Automobile Exception: United States v. Ross, 43 LA. L. REV.
1561, 1570-71 (1983) (asserting that the Court must provide an adequate substitute
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cause to believe that contraband is concealed within an automobile
or similarly mobile vehicle." The justification for the automobile
exception rests on two primary factors. 2 First, the inherent mobility
of an automobile creates such exigency that rigid enforcement of the
Second, an individual's
warrant requirement is not practical. 3
expectation of privacy is significantly diminished in a motor vehicle
due to the pervasive degree of governmental regulation and the
vehicle's visibility to all members of the public.4
Since its inception in 1925, the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement has undergone significant
refinement and expansion. 5 As this exception continues to broaden,
at least one commentator asserts that it does so at the expense of
individual privacy. 6 Moreover, Justice Scalia maintains that the
for a neutral and detached magistrate's probable cause determination); Peter C.
Prynkiewicz, Note, California v. Acevedo: The Court Establishes One Rule to Govern All
Automobile Searches and Opens the Door to Another "Frontal Assault" on the Warrant
Requirement, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1269, 1286 (1992) (stating that the Supreme
Court may have extended the automobile exception too far).
For an analysis of additional exceptions to the warrant requirement, see
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (permitting searches of
governmental employee offices); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985)
(evaluating mobile home searches); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20
(1977) (analyzing border searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 37576 (1976) (permitting inventory searches); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
248 (1973) (authorizing consent searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465 (1971) (recognizing the "plain view" exception); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (establishing the "search incident to arrest" exception);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (creating the "stop and frisk" exception).
One commentator has catalogued approximately 20 exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985).
1 See, e.g., Carroil, 267 U.S. at 161. In Carrol4 the Supreme Court established the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See id at
162.
2 See Opperman, 428 U.S. at
367.
3 See id.
(stating that the ready mobility of a vehicle could place it out of the
jurisdiction before the police could obtain a warrant).
14 See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93 (stating that an individual has
a diminished
expectation of privacy in a motor home based on its mobility and public nature).
The Court has alsojustified a vehicle inventory search on the basis that an individual
has a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at
368.
15 See Robert H. Whorf, "Coercive Ambiguity" in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned
Consent Search, 30 SuFFoLKU. L. REV. 379, 382 (1997).
16 See Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principlein the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 1, 16 (explaining that the automobile exception has been expanded "because
the Court believed clear rules were necessary . .

.

. even at the expense of the

'reasonable expectation of privacy' that had previously been the (troublesomely
flexible) basis of [F]ourth [A] mendment protections").
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Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement has become so
encumbered with exceptions that it is basically unrecognizable. 7
Absent the safeguards of the traditional warrant requirement,
however, it is unclear how much governmental intrusion a mere
reasonableness standard will permit.'
Recently, in Wyoming v. Houghton,"' the United States Supreme
Court expanded the scope of the automobile exception concerning
warrantless searches of passengers' containers that are found within
an automobile. 0 Justice Scalia announced that when a police officer
has probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed within an
automobile, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of a
passenger's personal effects found inside the vehicle if those personal
effects are large enough to conceal the object of the search.
On July 23, 1995, the Wyoming Highway Patrol conducted a
routine traffic stop of a driver for speeding and for driving with a
defective brake light 22 While questioning David Young, the vehicle's
driver, an officer observed a hypodermic syringe protruding from
Young's shirt pocket.2 3 The officer ordered Young out of the vehicle
and instructed him to place the syringe on the vehicle's hood. In
response to police questioning, Young admitted that he used the
syringe to inject narcotics. 25
Two female passengers were in the car as well, one of whom was
Upon Young's admission
the respondent, Sandra Houghton. 6
regarding his illicit use of the syringe, the police ordered the
remaining passengers out of the vehicle and conducted a search for
contraband in the vehicle's passenger compartment. 7 During the
17 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
IS

See Prynkiewicz, supra note 10, at 1269. Prynkiewicz explains that in Acevedo,

the Court "may have laid the logical groundwork for the eventual elimination of the
warrant requirement for searches conducted outside the home." Id.
19 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
20 See ia at 1304.
21 See id
2
See id at 1299.
22 See id.
24 See id.
25 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at
1299.
26 See id. All three occupants of the vehicle were seated in the front seat of the
car at the time of the traffic stop. See id.
27 See id
The police established probable cause to search the automobile for
contraband when Young admitted to the police that he used the syringe in his shirt
pocket to inject drugs. See id. Probable cause often may be established when the
police "utilize interrogation as a means to obtain more information about suspicious
persons and circumstances, and the suspect's response will sometimes elevate the
prior suspicions up to probable cause."

WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,

SETONHALL LAWREVIEW

582

[Vol. 30:578

ensuing search, the police discovered a purse on the back seat of the
2
Houghton immediately admitted ownership of the purse.2
vehicles.
Acting without a warrant, the police searched Houghton's purse and
found a syringe containing methamphetamine and other drug
paraphernalia. 0
Based on the evidence uncovered during the
warrantless search, the police placed Houghton under arrest."
Pursuant to a Wyoming statute, the State charged Houghton
with felony possession of a controlled substance."' Houghton moved
to suppress all of the evidence found in her purse, claiming that the
search violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 3'
The trial court denied Houghton's motion to
suppress, ruling that when the police have probable cause to search
an automobile for contraband, they may also search any container
capable of holding such contraband."
Subsequently, the jury

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 3.3(0, at 152 (2d ed. 1992).
28 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. Before discovering Houghton's license in her
purse, the police asked Houghton for identification. See id Initially, Houghton told
the police that she did not have identification, but claimed that her name was
"Sandra James." See id, Upon a subsequent search of the defendant's purse, the
police properly identified her as Sandra K. Houghton. See id. In response to police
questioning, Houghton told the police that she provided the false name "[iun case
things went bad." I&
See id
30 See id The drug paraphernalia and the syringe,
found in a brown pouch inside
of Houghton's purse, contained 60 ccs of methamphetamine. See id Houghton,
however, claimed the brown pouch did not belong to her. See id. Furthermore,
Houghton avowed that she had no knowledge of how the brown pouch came to be in
her purse. See id. In addition, the police also observed fresh needle-track marks on
Houghton's arms. See id
3'

See id.

See Wyo.

STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c) (Michie 1996).
The statute specifically
provides:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from,
or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise
authorized by this act. Any person who violates this subsection ...
[a] nd has in his possession any other controlled substance classified in
Schedule I, II or III in an amount greater than set forth in paragraph
(c) (i) of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment
for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand
dollars ($10,000.00), or both.
Id.
33 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct.
at 1299-1300.
34 See id. at 1300. Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment
is binding on the states. See LAURENCE H.TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 107, at 663 (2d ed. 1988).
35 See Houghton, 119 S.
Ct. at 1300.
32
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convicted Houghton. 6
Applying the "notice test,""7 the Wyoming Supreme Court
reversed Houghton's conviction.ss The Wyoming Supreme Court
held that when there is probable cause to search a vehicle, the police
may search containers found within the automobile that are capable
of concealing the object of the search.39 The Wyoming Supreme
Court qualified its conclusion, however, by holding that, when the
police know or should know that a container belongs to a passenger
not suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the container is not within the
permissible scope of the search unless someone had the occasion to
conceal the object of the search within the container.4
The
Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that, because police knew that
the purse did not belong to the driver and because there was no
reason to suspect that contraband had been concealed therein, the
search of Houghton's
purse was unreasonable and violated the
4
Fourth Amendment. '
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 to
consider whether police may search a passenger's personal effects
found inside an automobile when there is probable cause to believe
that the automobile contains contraband.4s The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that when the police have probable
cause to believe that contraband is present inside a vehicle, they may
search a passenger's personal effects found inside that vehicle if those
effects are large enough to conceal the object of the search." In
reaching its decision, the Court concluded that the search of
Houghton's purse would have been regarded as reasonable at the
time the Fourth Amendment was framed.4 In addition, the Court
determined that the governmental interest at stake outweighed the
intrusion on individual privacy given the diminished expectation of
3
37

See id.

See Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 369 (Wyo. 1998).

The Wyoming

Supreme Court explained that under a notice test the police "may assume that all
containers on the premises may be searched unless they know or should know that
the containers belong to someone not contemplated in the warrant or amenable to
search on the basis of probable cause." Id.
at 370 (citing State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d
350, 359 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)).
See idat 372.
39 See id.
4

See id.

41

See id.

SeeWyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. CL 31 (1998).
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. CL 1297, 1299 (1999).
See id. at 1304.
45 See id.
at 1300.
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privacy in a vehicle.46
The Supreme Court established the automobile exception to the47
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States.
In Carroll,federal prohibition agents had probable cause to believe
that an automobile was transporting liquor in violation of the
National Prohibition Act.4 The agents stopped the car and, during
the course of an immediate warrantless search, discovered large
quantities of liquor hidden under the upholstery of the seats.4 9 The
defendants were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor and,
on appeal, contended that the warrantless search of the automobile
violated their Fourth Amendment rights.-° The Supreme Court held
that when police have probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains contraband, an immediate warrantless search of that vehicle
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because of the exigency
that the vehicle's mobility creates." In light of legislation that
authorized warrantless searches of ships at the time the Fourth
Amendment was framed, the Court concluded that the warrantless
search of an
automobile is reasonable under the Fourth
52
Amendment.
See id. at 1302.
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4 See id at 160-61.
Probable cause to search the car arose in Carroll when
government agents recognized occupants of a vehicle, who were known to be
bootleggers, traveling along a route that the agents knew the bootleggers commonly
used to retrieve contraband liquor. See id. Finding that the government agents had
probable cause to search the vehicle, Justice Taft explained that "'[i]f the facts and
circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offense has been committed, [probable cause] is
sufficient.'" Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
49 See id. at 160-61.
50 See it at 143.
51 See id. at 146. The Supreme Court upheld the search because the exigency
created by the car's mobility made obtaining a warrant impractical. See id. The
Court explained that "[i]t is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile.
Before a warrant could be secured the automobile would be beyond the reach of the
officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of." Id.
"'Exigent circumstances' in relation to justification for warrantless arrest or
search refers generally to those situations in which law enforcement agents will be
unable or unlikely to effectuate an arrest, search or seizure for which probable cause
exists unless they act swiftly and without seeking prior judicial authorization."
4

47

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 398 (6th ed. 1991).

52 See Carrog 267 U.S. at 151 (discussing early legislation authorizing warrantless
searches of moveable vessels). The Carro/ Court reasoned that "(t]he Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." Id. at 149.
Recognizing the important distinction between structures and mobile vehicles, the
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5 the Supreme
Fifty-two years later, in United States v. Chadwick,"
Court revisited the automobile exception to determine whether a
container found inside an automobile may be searched without a
warrant. 4 In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause to
believe that a footlocker, which defendants had placed in the trunk
of an automobile, contained marijuana. 5 While the trunk of the car
was open and before the engine was started, the agents arrested the
defendants, seized the automobile with the footlocker still inside the
trunk, and transported the vehicle to a federal building.56 Ninety
minutes later, the agents conducted a warrantless search of the 200pound footlocker and discovered a large quantity of marijuana
hidden inside.57 The Chadwick Court held that the warrantless search
of the footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment because an
individual expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects
than he does in his automobile.58 The Court additionally recognized
that while the seizure of the footlocker was constitutionally
permissible, the ensuing search was unconstitutional because it took
place more than ninety minutes later, when the police had no reason
to fear that the evidence would be destroyed.'9

CarrollCourt stated:
[C] ontemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment we
find in the First Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth
Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling
house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a moveable vessel where they readily could be put out of
reach of a search warrant.
Id. at 151.
5s 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
5
See id. at 3.
55 See id at 3-5. In Chadwick, railroad officials in San Diego noticed the
defendants loading an unusually heavy footlocker onto a train bound for Boston. See
id. at 3. Officials became suspicious when they observed that the footlocker was
leaking talcum powder, a substance used to conceal the odor of marijuana. See id. In
addition, one of the defendants matched a profile used to identify drug traffickers.
See id. Railroad officials reported their observations to federal agents in San Diego,
who in turn relayed the information to federal agents in Boston, who were present
with a police dog when the train arrived in Boston. See id. Probable cause arose
when the police dog that was trained to detect marijuana signaled the presence of a
controlled substance inside the footlocker. See id. at 3-4. The dog's action confirmed
the officer's suspicions that the footlocker contained marijuana. See id. at 5.
5
See id. at 4.
57 See id.
at 4-5.
See id. at 13.
s9 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. The Chadwick Court reasoned that, because the
police had the footlocker under their exclusive control, there was no danger that
evidence could be destroyed before the police could obtain a warrant. See id.
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To resolve the confusion surrounding the application of
Chadwick to warrantless searches of luggage found in automobiles, the
Supreme Court, in Arkansas v. Sanders,60 considered whether the
police, in the absence of exigent circumstances, must secure a
warrant before searching luggage found in an automobile that is
In Sanders, the
properly stopped and searched for contraband.'
police had probable cause to believe that a suitcase placed in the
trunk of a taxi contained marijuana. 62 The Court held that, in the
absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant must support a search of
luggage found inside a vehicle, even if discovered during the course
of an otherwise constitutional search.0 The Court explained that the
warrant requirement protects luggage found inside a vehicle just as it
protects luggage found anywhere else."
Moreover, the Court
declined to extend Carrollto luggage found within a vehicle because
the dual rationales that justify the automobile exception, inherent
mobility and a diminished expectation of privacy, are inapplicable to
luggage.65
The Supreme Court again revisited the constitutionality of
container searches two years later in Robbins v. California." In Robbins,
during the course of a traffic stop, police established probable cause
67
to believe that the defendant's station wagon contained marijuana.
442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 754.
62 See id. at 755. The police established probable cause
in Sanders when they
corroborated a tip provided by a reliable informant, who told them that the suspect
would arrive on a certain flight at the local airport and that the suspect would be
carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. See id.Three months earlier, the
same informant had provided police with information that led to the same
defendant's arrest and conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See id
63 See id at 766.
The Sanders Court further asserted that "[t]he mere
reasonableness of a search, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances, is not
a substitute for the judicial warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment." Id
at 758. Sanders has been interpreted as one of the Court's last efforts to provide
adequate protections for the privacy interest in containers transported in a vehicle.
Seeensen, supranote 10, at 1570-71.
See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763-64.
65 See idat 763-65. The Sanders Court observed that, because the police
can place
luggage under their exclusive control, such a search should not be justified under a
mobility theory. See id Moreover, because luggage is a common repository of
personal effects and thus is associated with an expectation of privacy, the Sanders
Court concluded that such a search should not be justified under a diminished
expectation of privacy theory. See id.
66 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
67 See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 422. Probable cause arose
in Robbins when, during the
course of a traffic stop for erratic driving, police smelled marijuana smoke in the
petitioner's car. See id
60
61
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During the ensuing search, an officer found two packages covered in
green opaque plastic hidden in a recessed luggage compartment.68
The police searched the packages and found fifteen-pound bricks of
marijuana in each. 69 In a plurality opinion, Justice Stewart concluded
that any closed opaque container found inside an automobile enjoys
constitutional protection and may not be searched without a
warrant.0 The plurality reasoned that such a container is fully
protected by the warrant requirement unless its contents are in plain
view, because an individual manifests an expectation of privacy by
placing items inside a container.7' Moreover, the plurality declined to
draw a distinction between types of containers, noting that there are
no objective criteria to make such a distinction."
The bright-line rule announced in Robbins was ephemeral,
however, as the Court overruled itself a few months later in United
States v. Ross." In Ross, the police had probable cause to believe that
the defendant was selling narcotics from the trunk of his car.74
Having stopped the vehicle, an officer opened the trunk and
discovered a closed paper bag."5 Without a warrant, the officer
searched the bag and found heroin.76
The defendant was
subsequently convicted of possession of heroin with intent to
distribute." Overruling the plurality decision set forth in Robbins, the
Supreme Court held that when the police have probable cause to
search an entire vehicle, they may conduct as thorough a search as a
magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. 78 Moreover, the
68
69

See id.
See i&

See id.at 428-29.
See id,at 427.
7
See id. at 426. The plurality refused to draw a distinction on the basis of privacy
interests in various types of packages, noting that "[w] hat one person may put into a
suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." Id.(citing United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d
1159 (1981) (en banc)). Ironically, Ross, on which the Robbins plurality relied, was
overruled by the Supreme Court.
73 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
74 See id at 800-01. In Ross, the police received an anonymous
tip from a reliable
informant, who told them that an individual was selling narcotics from the trunk of
his car in a certain location in the District of Columbia. See id.Probable cause arose
after the police corroborated the informant's tip by immediately driving to the
location and matching the detailed descriptions given by the informant. See i& at
801.
7 See
id
70

71

76

"

See ii.
See it.

See id at 823. The Court noted that its decision in Ross was inconsistent with
Robbins. See i& at 824. Consequently, the Court expressly rejected the precise
78
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Court declared that when the police have probable cause to search a
vehicle, a search of any part of that vehicle, including any
compartment that may contain the object of the search, isjustified.7
To reexamine the automobile exception and its application to
searches of containers found inside of a vehicle, the Supreme Court,
nine years later, decided Californiav. Acevedo." The Court considered
whether police must first obtain a warrant to search a container
found inside of a vehicle when the police have probable cause
specific to that container, but not extending to the entire vehicle."
In Acevedo, the police had probable cause to believe that a paper bag
that the defendant had placed in the trunk of his car contained
marijuana.8 Fearing that evidence would be lost, the police stopped
holding of Robbins, as well as the portion of Sanders on which the Robbins majority
relied. See id.
79 See Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. The Court distinguished the holdings of Chadwick
and Sanders by recognizing that neither of those cases involved the automobile
exception because police lacked probable cause to search the automobile "or
anything within it except the footlocker in the former case and the green suitcase in
the latter." Id. at 814. Moreover, the Court in Ross rejected Chadwick's distinction
between cars and containers and held that "[a] warrant to search a vehicle would
support a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of the
search." Id at 821. At least one commentator has criticized the decision set forth in
Ross and advocated a return to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See R
Andrew Taggart, Jr., Note, Criminal Procedure--Searchand Seizure-Closed Containers
Found Pursuant to Legitimate Automobile Search May Be Searched Without Benefit of a
Warrant: United States v. Ross, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1013, 1028-29 (1983). The author
asserts that "the [F]ourth [A]mendment, in its protection against abusive searches
and seizures, surely does not give way to prompt law enforcement solely in the
interest of efficiency." Id.
80 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
81 See idL at 573. The Court squared the issue by stating, "We must now decide...
whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open [a
container] in a moveable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search
the entire car." Id.
82 See id. at 580. In Acevedo, an investigator with the Santa Ana Police Department
in California received a telephone call from an agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) located in Hawaii. See id at 566-67. The DEA agent told
the Santa Ana police investigator that he had seized a package containing nine bags
of marijuana that was addressed toJ.R Daza in Santa Ana and was to be delivered via
Federal Express. See id at 567. The DEA agent forwarded the package to the Santa
Ana police investigator who, upon receiving the package, opened it and confirmed
that it contained marjuana. See id. The police left the package at the Federal
Express office in Santa Ana for pick up by Daza. See id. The next day, a man
identifying himself as Daza picked up the package, brought it to his apartment, and
carried it inside. See id. Shortly thereafter, the police observed Daza exit his
apartment and discard in the trash the paper and the box that had concealed the
marijuana. See id. Two hours later, Acevedo arrived and entered the apartment. See
id Acevedo exited only 10 minutes later carrying a paper bag that appeared to be
full. See id. Probable cause arose when the police observed that the bag that Acevedo
was carrying resembled one of the packages containing marijuana that had been
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the defendant's vehicle, searched the trunk and the paper bag
contained therein, and discovered marijuana." The defendant pled
guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana for sale, but reserved
for appeal the issue of whether the trial court should have suppressed
the evidence found inside the bag within the vehicle's trunk." The
Supreme Court held that a warrant is not required to conduct a
search of a container found within a vehicle when that search is
supported by probable cause to believe that the container holds
contraband or evidence of a crime.8 The Court's holding expressly
overruled Arkansas v. Sanders.' The Court reasoned that the existing
rule had provided only minimal protection for personal privacy and
87
served as an unnecessary impediment to effective law enforcement.
In a significant concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority, though not because the container in question is subject to
the automobile exception; rather, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
search of a container, outside of a privately-owned structure and
supported by probable cause to believe the container conceals
contraband, is not a search that would be unreasonable without a
warrant.88 Stressing the need for clarity and consistency in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court
should return to the traditional reasonableness requirement and
demand a warrant only in those situations in which the common law
so required.'

Against this background, the United States Supreme Court, in
Wyoming v. Houghton," concluded that when the police have probable
delivered to the apartment by undercover officers earlier that day. See id
83 See idat 567.
84 See idat 568.
85 See idat 580. The Court sought to eliminate what it described as the "curious
line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container
and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." Id.
The Court asserted that "[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn
on such coincidences." Id But see Briscoe, supra note 10, at 225 (maintaining that
the reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile should not extend to closed

containers that are coincidentally present in a car).
See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579. The Acevedo Court concluded that, in light of the
anomalous results produced by Sanders, "it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to
govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed
containers set forth in Sanders." Id.
86

87

See id. at 574. Acevedo has been interpreted as a "clear departure from prior

decisions holding that a search of such a (closed] container is subject to the warrant
requirement." Angell, supra note 10, at 733.
See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 584-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89 See id. at 583 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
90 119S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
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cause to search an automobile for contraband, they may also search
any container found therein, irrespective of ownership, when that
container is large enough to conceal the object of the search.9 '
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the analysis by
focusing on the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.9
The Justice announced that, in considering whether governmental
action violates the Fourth Amendment, the Court must employ a twopart test.' The Justice explained that the Court initially must inquire
whether the governmental action would have been considered illegal
under the common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was
framed.94 If that inquiry yields no answer, stated the Justice, then the
Court must evaluate the action under the traditional standards of
reasonableness by balancing the governmental interests against the
intrusion upon individual privacy."'
After noting that the police had probable cause to believe that
the automobile contained drugs, the Court evaluated the historical
treatment of warrantless searches of vehicles that occurred when
Drawing on Carroll, Justice Scalia
probable cause existed. 96
highlighted the Court's conclusion that the framers of the Fourth
Amendment would have regarded as reasonable a warrantless search
of a vehicle for contraband as long as the search was supported by
probable cause.97
Justice Scalia discussed early legislation, created in an effort to
enforce duties and tariffs on imported merchandise, that permitted
warrantless searches of ships and vessels upon probable cause. 9s The
Justice observed that because such merchandise was shipped in
containers, Congress, having authorized a warrandess search for such
merchandise, could not have conceivably intended customs officials
91
92

See id. at 1304.

93

See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300.

See id at 1300. For a discussion of the Reasonableness Clause, see supra notes
5-6 and accompanying text.
94 See id.

See id. For a detailed discussion of the reasonableness balancing test, see
supra note 3, § 18, at 255-57 (tracing the development of the
reasonableness balancing standard in relation to the Fourth Amendment).
96 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. Justice Scalia explained that the Carroll Court
considered early congressional legislation from 1789 through 1799, as well as the
legislation from the Founding era that followed, authorizing customs agents to
conduct warrantless searches upon any ship or vessel when there was probable cause
to believe that the ships contained contraband. See id
95

DRESSLER,

97 See id

98 See id (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925)). For a
discussion of Carroll, see supranotes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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to secure a warrant for every container found during the search."
Justice Scalia then emphasized the breadth of the rule in Ross, in
which the Court held that when probable cause supports a lawful
search of a vehicle, it also supports a search of every part of the
vehicle that may contain the object of the search, including the
vehicle's compartments.' ® The Justice observed that the Ross Court
took a crucial step by holding that closed containers in vehicles may
be searched without a warrant because of their presence inside the
vehicle.'
Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that later cases expanded
Ross to apply to all containers found inside a vehicle without
qualification as to ownership.' 2
As a result of this expansion, the Court recognized that there
was no ownership issue regarding the searched container in Ross.'0t
Justice Scalia explained that if Ross had intended to limit the rule to
items belonging to the driver or to items other than those belonging
to passengers, the Court would have expressed such a substantial
limitation.'" Further, and more importantly, the Justice emphasized
that nothing in the historical evidence upon which the Ross Court
relied excepted from authorized warrantless search containers
belonging to passengers on suspect ships, carriages, or automobiles.' 5
Next, the Court turned to the analytical principle underlying
Ross that the permissible scope of a warrantless search is determined
by the object of the search as well as the place where the police have
probable cause to believe that an item may be found.'0 Justice Scalia
emphasized that the reasonableness of a search does not require that
the owner of the property is suspected of a crime, but rather, only
that reasonable cause is present to believe that the object of the
search is located on the premises to which entry is sought 0
Finally, the Court concluded its first inquiry by noting that the
historical evidence upon which the Ross Court relied failed to draw a
See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26).
100 See id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
101 See id

See id. (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 479-80 (1985)).
102

103

See id.

104

See id.

105
06
107

See Houghto, 119S. Ct. at 1301.
See i. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
See id. (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)).

In Zurcher,

police obtained a wa-rant to search the files of a student newspaper for photographs
relating to the identity of persons who attacked police officers during a
demonstration. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 551.
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distinction between containers on the basis of ownership.'Os Thus, the
Court determined that when a search of an automobile is supported
by probable cause, the police may search every container found
therein without a showing of individualized suspicion for each
container.' Echoing the critical step taken by the Ross Court, Justice
Scalia concluded that the police may search not only the driver's
belongings or containers found within the car, but also those of any
passenger because of the presence of those items inside the vehicle." °
After concluding that the search at issue would have been
regarded as reasonable at the time the Fourth Amendment was
framed, Justice Scalia turned to the second inquiry to evaluate the
search under the traditional standards of reasonableness."' At the
outset, the Court opined that even if the historical evidence were
equivocal, the balancing of individual privacy concerns with
governmental interests weighs decidedly in favor of the government
in this case.' The Justice advanced several reasons why both drivers
and passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy in items that
they transport in vehicles that travel public thoroughfares."' The
Court first explained that automobiles usually are not used as
repositories for personal effects." 4 Further, Justice Scalia observed
that automobiles are subject to pervasive governmental controls."5
in a
The Justice additionally noted that if an automobile was involved
6
traffic accident, its contents would be open to public view."
Next, Justice Scalia distinguished the instant case from those
cases upon which the Wyoming Supreme Court relied."7 In so doing,
the Justice emphasized that both United States v. Di Re" 8 and Ybarra v.
108

See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1301.

109 See id
110 See id

I

See id at 1302.
See id.
11 See id (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). The CardwellCourt
112

permitted a warrantless search, through which the police obtained paint scrapings
from the exterior of a car, based on an individual's diminished expectation of privacy
in his automobile. See CardweU,417 U.S. at 590.
114 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting Cardwegl 417 U.S. at 590).
115 See id
116 See id
117 See id.
332 U.S. 581 (1948). In United States v. Di Re, the Court reviewed the search of
an automobile passenger that occurred during the arrest of the driver. See id at 59394. In considering the reasonableness of the search, the Court was not convinced
that "a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of
his person to which he would otherwise be entitled." Id. at 587. Thus, the Di Re
118

Court concluded that probable cause to search an automobile did not justify a body
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Illinois"9 involved body searches.' 20 The Justice stressed that Di Re and
Ybarra implicated the heightened protection afforded against the
search of a person.12 t Justice Scalia also observed that even a limited
search of an individual's outer clothing is a severe intrusion upon
Thus, the Justice noted that the traumatic
personal privacy.ln
consequences associated with a body search should not be expected
when the police search personal property.'9
Having concluded that a passenger's privacy expectations are
diminished considerably inside a vehicle, the Court illustrated why
the governmental interests are substantial. 24 Justice Scalia initially
noted that the mobility of a car creates a risk that evidence will be lost
while a warrant is obtained. 2 5 The Justice explained that law
enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to
conduct an immediate search of a passenger's belongings when there
26
is reason to believe that evidence of a crime is hidden in the car.1
Next, the Court maintained that a passenger and driver are often
engaged in a common enterprise and, therefore, will share an
search of a passenger. See id. at 593-94.
In Ybarra v. Illinois, the Supreme Court reviewed the
119 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
constitutionality of patting down a tavern patron during the execution of a search
warrant for the tavern itself. See id.at 87-90. The Court was "asked to find that the
first patdown search of Ybarra constituted a reasonable frisk for weapons under the
doctrine of Terry v. Ohio." Id at 92. The Court, however, refused to find that the
patdown was reasonable, stating that "[t]he initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not
supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief
which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a
person for weapons." Id at 92-93. Thus, the Court concluded that the mere fact that
Ybarra was present in a tavern that was subject to a search warrant did not, without
more, provide the police officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that he was
armed and dangerous. See id. at 91.
120 See Houghton, 119 S.Ct. at 1302. The Justice noted that, due to
"the degree of
intrusiveness upon personal privacy and indeed even personal dignity," the cases
relied upon by the Wyoming Supreme Court involving body searches differ
substantially from searches of containers. Id.
121 See
id
1
See id (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)). In Teny, the Supreme
Court announced that the police may conduct a limited seizure of an individual and
a limited patdown of that individual when there is reasonable suspicion that the
individual is armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31; see also Anthony C.
Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 956, 962-63 (1999) (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard utilized
in Teny is based on "a quantum of suspicion that is less substantial than the 'probable
cause' standard that the police must satisfy when conducting full-blown arrests and
equivalent seizures of the person").
23 See Houghton, 119S. Ct. at
1302.
124 See id.
125 See id
126 See id
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interest in concealing the fruits of a crime. 12 7 Finally, the Court
asserted that a criminal could hide contraband in a passenger's
belongings, perhaps even surreptitiously and without the passenger's
12
1
permission, as easily as in other containers within the vehicle.
Justice Scalia then turned to the potential burdens that the
Wyoming Supreme Court's rule would place on effective law
enforcement!" The Court explained that imposing a rule that
requires the police to have reason to suspect that a passenger and
driver are involved in a common enterprise would dramatically
reduce the ability of the police to find fruits of a crime. Likewise, the
Justice explained that requiring the police to have reason to believe
that the driver had a chance to conceal contraband in a passenger's
belongings, either surreptitiously or with permission, would also
impede effective law enforcement'3 Further, the Court found that
once a "passenger's property" exception became known to the public,
passenger-confederates would undoubtedly lay claim to all
Moreover, the Justice warned
contraband found during a search.'
that a flood of litigation could result from a "passenger's property"
exception to automobile searches in the forms of increased motions
to suppress in criminal proceedings and private civil lawsuits.'32 Thus,
127

See id.

128

See id. at 1303. The Court reiterated Houghton's contention that most of the

contraband must have been hidden in her purse by one of the other individuals in
the car without her knowledge or permission. See id. The Court relied on precedent
to support its assertion that a criminal could easily conceal contraband in another
person's belongings. See id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102 (1980)).
In Rawlings, a defendant claimed ownership of drugs that were found in another
individual's handbag. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 106. The Rawlings Court held that
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in another's purse
and thus lacked standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence found
therein. See id
29 See Houghton, 119 S.
Ct. at 1303.
so See id
13 See
id.
132 See id Justice Scalia speculated that the following questions may arise in
the
resulting lawsuits if the Wyoming Supreme Court's notice rule became the law of the
land:
[W]hether the officer should have believed a passenger's claim of
ownership, whether [the officer] should have inferred ownership from
various objective factors, whether [the officer] had probable cause to
believe that the passenger was a confederate, or to believe that the
driver might have introduced the contraband into the package with or
without the passenger's knowledge.
Id. at 1303.
In addition, Justice Scalia criticized the dissent's confidence that a police officer
could "'apply a rule requiring a warrant or individualized probable cause to search
belongings that are.., obviously owned by and in the custody of a passenger.'" Id at
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the Court concluded that the balancing of the competing interests
favor of law enforcement and against an individual's privacy
weighs in
13 3
interest.
Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that even if the Court were to
create an exception from the historic practice detailed in Ross, such
an exception, strangely, would protect only a passenger's property,
rather than the property of a nonoccupant.'3 4 Thus, the Court held
that when police have reason to believe that a vehicle contains
contraband, the police may search a passenger's effects found
therein, whether the owner of the effects is present or not, if that
container is capable of concealing the object of the search."
Accordingly, the majority reversed the judgment of the Wyoming
Supreme Court.3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority
that when the police have probable cause to search a vehicle for
drugs, the search of containers found therein is reasonable.' s' Justice
Breyer cautioned, however, that while history may serve as an
important guideline in answering Fourth Amendment questions,
historical analysis should never automatically determine the outcome
of a case.1s8
Justice Breyer also agreed with the majority that requiring the
police to establish ownership of a container prior to its search would
place a substantial burden on law enforcement.' 9 Moreover, the
Justice noted that when probable cause exists to search a vehicle, the
police often have probable cause to search containers found
therein.'4° Thus, Justice Breyer suggested that the bright-line rule
announced by the Court will authorize only a small number of

1303 n.2 (quoting Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 (StevensJ, dissenting)). TheJustice
countered that "it seems not at all obvious precisely what constitutes obviousness"
and, thus, the notice test is unclear and unadministrable. Id.
13
13

See id.
See id

1s5 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1303. In reaching this decision, Justice Scalia took
into account that Houghton's privacy would have been invaded to the same extent
whether she was present for the search or not, and that Houghton's presence in the
car provided more reason to suspect that she and the driver were engaged in a
common enterprise. See id.
13

See id.

See id at 1303 (Breyer,J., concurring).
See id. at 1303-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139 See id. Justice Breyer asserted that "[i]f the police must
establish a container's
ownership prior to the search of [a] container . .. the resulting uncertainty will
destroy the workability of the bright-line rule set forth in United States v. Ross." Id
140 See id at 1304 (Breyer,J.,
concurring).
137

I
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searches that the existing law would not already permit.14 1
Justice Breyer then gave consideration to the limitations placed
upon the scope of the majority's bright-line rule.' 42 The Justice noted
that the rule announced by the majority only governs automobile4
searches and exclusively applies to containers found in vehicles.'
Implicitly recognizing the distinction between searches of a person
and searches of property, the Justice stressed that the search of a
person, including a limited patdown of an individual's outer clothing,
is the type of search for which the law provides heightened
protection.'"
Justice Breyer next addressed the nature of the container in the
instant case. 4 5 The Justice argued that purses are special containers
because they are repositories of personal effects that people generally
carry with them.' 46 Although Justice Breyer admitted a temptation to
afford purses increased constitutional protection, the Justice decided
not to draw such a distinction in light of the Court's prior opinions.17
The Justice, however, did assert that if a person is wearing a purse at
the time of a warrantless search, the purse may amount to a type of
outer clothing that would be afforded increased protection.'1 Given
that Houghton was not actually wearing the purse 49at the time of the
search, Justice Breyer concurred with the majority.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, authored
a dissenting opinion. "' Arguing that the Court has never restricted
its analysis by considering the privacy and governmental interests at
stake only when the common law yields no answer, the Justice
rejected the majority's two-part test. 5' Further, the Justice contended
that neither the precedent relied upon by the majority nor the
Court's decision in the instant case required such an approach. 52
Emphasizing the Court's established preference that the police
should obtain search warrants at the outset, Justice Stevens criticized
141
142
'43

See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id.

See id.

144 See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).

For an explanation of

Ter, see supra note 122.

See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id.
147 See id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
822 (1982)).
148 See id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S.
at 24).
149 See id.
ISO See id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
14

151 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 n.3 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
152 See i&
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the majority for upholding the search of Houghton's purse in light of
the State's admission that the police lacked probable cause or
individualized suspicion as to the purse or passenger.' 3 The Justice
noted that the factors prompting the search in the instant case, as in
Di Re, implicated the driver and not the passenger.'- Further, Justice
Stevens chided the majority for ignoring the settled distinction
between searches of drivers and searches of passengers and, instead,
fashioning a bright-line rule based on a distinction between property
concealed in a pocket and property concealed in a passenger's
In addition, the Justice criticized the Court's rightspurse. s'
restrictive application of the rule announced in Ross.'6 The dissent
argued that regardless of whether the police should have obtained a
warrant to search Houghton's purse, the officers were required to
cause to believe that Houghton's purse contained
have probable
57
contraband.

Next, Justice Stevens engaged in a reasonableness analysis and
concluded that the passenger's privacy concerns outweigh the State's
interest in efficient law enforcement.-' Justice Stevens found that the
search of a purse involves serious intrusion on individual privacy. '59
Finally, the Justice argued that a rule requiring the police to have
probable cause or a warrant to conduct a search of a passenger's
belongings is just as simple as the majority's rule, yet would provide
more protection of privacy.' 60 Thus, in light of the Court's longstanding preference for individualized suspicion and for warrants,
Justice Stevens concluded that the Wyoming Supreme Court's

See id at 1305 (StevensJ, dissenting).
See id. Justice Stevens noted that Di Re is the only automobile case involving the
search of a passenger defendant. See id. The Justice emphasized that the Di Re Court
refused to apply the automobile exception to a passenger defendant. See id. (citing
153
154

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 583-87 (1948)).
155 See id.
15
See id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982)).

Ross

announced that the scope of a warrantless search "is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found." Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.
157 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens chided

the majority for creating a rule that would permit "a warrantless search of a
passenger's briefcase if there is probable cause to believe the taxidriver had a syringe
somewhere in his vehicle." Id. at 1305 (StevensJ., dissenting).

See id.
See id. Justice Stevens opined that the spatial association between a driver and
passenger does not provide an adequate basis for "ignoring privacy interests in a
purse." Id.
158
119

160

See id. at 1306 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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6
judgment should be affirmed.1 '

The bright-line rule embraced by the United States Supreme
Court in Wyoming v. Houghton exhibits the growing trend in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to promote the governmental interest in
efficient law enforcement at the expense of individual privacy.6

2

The

Court succeeded in setting forth a clear and unambiguous guideline
capable of consistent application by the police in the context of
automobile searches.'3 Yet although a clear rule of law is often
attractive, clarity alone is insufficient tojustify a rule's adoption.'"
The clarity of the bright-line rule announced in Houghton leaves
little to be disputed. What should be questioned, however, is the
potential overextension of the rule. While Houghton is an automobile
exception case, the rule announced by the Court appears to have
applicability outside of the automobile context.6' The reasoning
underlying Houghton easily could be extended to support a "public
place" exception to the Fourth Amendment's fading warrant
requirement.'6 A strong argument could be made that a warrantless
search of any closed container discovered in a public place, if67
supported by probable cause, would pass constitutional muster.
Justice Scalia has already announced his willingness to permit such

1

162

See id. at 1305 (StevensJ., dissenting).
See Stacey Paige Rappaport, Note, Search and Seizure-Stop and Frisk-PoliceMay

Seize Nonthreatening Contraband Detected Through the Sense of Touch During a Protective
Patdown Search So Long as the Search Stays Within the Bounds Marked by Terry v. OhioMinnesota v. Dickerson, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 2257, 2267-69 (1994) (explaining the

Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment balancing test and highlighting the Court's
belief that the governmental interest in effective law enforcement must often
outweigh even a probable cause requirement in the context of a permissible stop and
frisk).

See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
See id. at 1306 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that "the
ostensible clarity of the Court's rule is attractive. But that virtue is insufficient
justification for its adoption." Id.
65 SeePrynkiewicz, supra note 10, at 1286.
166 See id.
167 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584-85 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia writes:
I would reverse the judgment in the present case, not because a closed
container carried inside a car becomes subject to the "automobile"
exception to the general warrant requirement, but because the search
63
64

of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, with probable

cause to believe that the container contains contraband, and when it in
fact does contain contraband, is not one of those searches whose
Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant.
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searches,'" and considering the rationale supporting the opinion in
Houghton, a majority of the Court might not be far behind.
While the decision in Houghton is fully consistent with the
Court's rights-restrictive approach to the automobile exception, the
issue was, nevertheless, wrongly decided because the automobile
exception should not extend to moveable containers found inside a
vehicle.' 69 The justifications that support the automobile exception,
such as mobility, a diminished expectation of privacy, and the
impracticability of obtaining a warrant, are not applicable to
moveable containers. First, a warrantless search of a container should
not be justified under a mobility theory because the police can place
a container within their exclusive control and thereby eliminate any
danger that evidence could be destroyed. Likewise, any exigency
related to the vehicle's mobility effectively ceases once the container
is removed from the vehicle. Similarly, because moveable containers
are not subject to the same pervasive governmental regulations to
which automobiles are subject, an individual's diminished
expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not extend to containers
found in that vehicle.1 70
Finally, in light of technological
168

See idi

See Katz, supra note 6, at 378-79 (1986). Katz maintains that the Court, in
the
interest of convenience, has replaced the true exigency requirement on which Carroll
was based with a fictitious exigency rationale. See id.
170 See Briscoe, supra note 10, at 225-26. Briscoe maintains
that the extension of
the automobile exception to moveable containers is inappropriate and unreasonable
as a matter of law. See id at 222-25. Moreover, Briscoe addresses the "impracticability
of obtaining a warrant" rationale used to justify the automobile exception and
concludes that "any warrantless search pursuant to the automobile exception should
be found unreasonable when the opportunity to search is no longer 'fleeting."' Id at
224. Briscoe further maintains that an individual manifests a legitimate expectation
of privacy in effects concealed within a container. See id at 225. The mere fact that
such a container is located in a car is coincidental and, thus, the container should
not be subject to a warrantless search under the automobile exception. See id at 225.
This sentiment has been echoed by another commentator who observed that
[t]he factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do
not apply to [luggage]. Luggage contents are not open to public view,
except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is
luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a
continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is
transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects.
In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile.
Jensen, supra note 10, at 1566 n.34.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a privacy interest in luggage is
reasonable. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979) (stating that luggage is
a repository for personal effects and, therefore, is associated with an expectation of
privacy); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (noting that
expectations of privacy in luggage are substantially greater than expectations of
6
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advancements, a warrantless search of a container found inside a
vehicle should not be sanctioned under an impracticality theory
because Congress
has explicitly authorized the use of telephonic
7
warrants.1 1
Indeed, modern technology offers a viable solution that would
uphold the constitutional preference that probable cause be
determined by a neutral and detached magistrate, as opposed to a
police officer engaged in the practice of ferreting out crime. In Given
the speed and efficiency of the technology available to the police, the
Supreme Court should require law enforcement personnel to await
the issuance of a telephonic warrant before searching a moveable
container found during the course of an automobile search.73
Telephonic warrants enable law enforcement personnel to receive
prompt judicial authorization to search while ensuring maximum
protection of an individual's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. 4
Given the Fourth

privacy in a car).
1
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(a). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide for the issuance of a warrant under certain circumstances "based upon sworn
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means including
facsimile transmission." Id. For further discussion regarding the issuance of
telephonic warrants, see Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 441 (1993)
(asserting that if the Fourth Amendment is to be taken seriously, courts should
require that the police secure a warrant, even a telephonic warrant, before every
search unless that search is necessitated by truly exigent circumstances); Geoffrey P.
Alpert, Note, Telephonic Search Warrants, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 634-35 (1984)
(advocating the use of telephonic search warrants to authorize automobile-exception
container searches).
17 SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
Specifically, the Court
stated that
[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id.
173 See Katz, supra note 6, at 388.
174 See Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives,
and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73
DENV. U. L. REv. 293, 295 (1996) (explaining that modern technology has created
ways for the warrant requirement to be fulfilled virtually without exception through
the use of mobile fax machines, telephones, and computers). Beci asserts that
"[a]ll that would be needed . . . would be a central facility with

magistrates on duty and available 24 hours a day. All police... could
call in by telephone or other electronic device .... The magistrates

would evaluate [the] facts and, if deemed sufficient to justify a search
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Amendment's long-standing preference for warrants, warrantless
searches of containers should be sanctioned only when true exigency
exists and when the immediate needs of law enforcement outweigh the
privacy 7 interests
that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
5
protect.
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and seizure, the magistrate would immediately issue an electronic
warrant authorizing the officer on the scene to proceed."
Id. at 293 (quoting State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1363 n.6 (Or. 1986)).
75 See Katz, supra note 6, at 378. Katz maintains that the warrant requirement
should be relaxed only in the presence of genuine exigent circumstances. See id. In
stressing the importance of the role of a neutral and detached magistrate, Katz
stated:
"I T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the
hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests.
Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort
to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of
petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the
capture of persons accused of crime."
Id. at 379 (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)). As one
commentator suggested:
[T]he Fourth Amendment strikes a balance between our need to be
secure from criminals and our need to be secure from the police. To
the extent that the police are free to conduct unlimited searches and
seizures, more criminals are likely to be caught, but at the same time,
more innocent citizens are likely to be subjected to the embarrassment
and and/or offense of a search or seizure.
ARNOLD H. LOEWY & ARTHUR B. LAFRANcE, supra note 5, at 1.

